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Macro Outlook Life after SVB and Credit Suisse: testing the separation principle

20 March 2023

Gilles Moec, AXA Group Chief Economist & AXA IM Head of Research




The US banking issue: the macro risks triggered by « deposit migration »

Deposits could continue to shift from smaller to larger banks, with risks for aggregate credit origination

In the US, smaller banks present a much higher Loand to Deposit Ratio than the larger ones – even if on aggreate they are less exposed to IR sensitive securities on their asset side

Aggregate ratios of US domestic banks % as of 8 March 2023 ■ Loan to Deposit ratio Securities to Assets ratio 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 Large banks Small banks Source: Federal Reserve Bank, AXA IM Research, March 2023

Smaller banks crucial for the real estate sector




SVB's demise driven by sectorially concentrated deposits (tech) combined with poor ALM (no hedging of massive exposure to interest rate sensitive securities). This may be idiosyncratic but deposits are being moved from smaller, regional banks to large institutions, whose appetite to lend – in particular to commercial real estate operators – is lower.




What to monitor after Credit Suisse: banks' funding costs globally

So far, banks' funding costs have risen roughly in line with risk-free rates – it may change if confidence is durably shaken

As central banks were tightening policy, banks' funding costs have signicantly risen so far...



...but so far banks' haven't had to pay a large risk premium relative to previous episodes of stress




Tension over the last few weeks triggered a rise in the banks' funding spread (i.e. relative to sovereign yields) but this has remained modest relative to previous episodes of stress. A key issue is how investors will react to the solution found with UBS – and large contribution from the Swiss government and central bank. AT1 bonds have been burned, but bonds further above the seniority ladder have been protected.



A key conduit from market stress to the real economy


A tight historical correlation between banks' funding costs and their lending standards

Credit standards – a key déterminant of credit supply – often react to changes in banks' funding costs in Europe....



03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Source: Bloomberg, AXA IM Research, March 2023

...and in the US




Source: Fed, ECB, ICE, Bloomberg and AXA IM Research, March 2023




Credit origination has already taken a hit – but some protection from corporate liquidity buffers

European credit impulse was negative before the turmoil emerged – but firms at still cash rich in aggregate terms

Euro area credit impulse collapsing



Impact so far blunted by large liquidity buffers in the corporate sector




The flow of new loans to the corporate sector was already falling in yoy terms in December and January. However, one needs to consider the fact that the pandemic has left many corporates unusually cash-rich, with lots of liquid assets allowing them to deal better with a contraction in credit supply.




Markets have drastically revised their monetary policy expectations – we think this has gone too far

Lower terminal rates – and even rate cuts in the US – are now priced, despite still elevated inflation

Rate cuts are priced for the Fed again



A pause seen at the ECB



In a nutshell the market does not believe in the "separation principle", according to which central banks can deal with financial stability issues by extending liquidity without altering their policy stance. While we agree central banks now need to be more prudent – and proceeding by 25 bps increments makes much more sense than 50s – expecting a reversal of monetary policy is hard to justify in a context of stubborn inflation. Central banks would recalibrate only if it's absolutely clear that the real economy is hit hard by the banking turmoil, which would imply the CB and government support measures currently activated fail.


The « easy part » of disinflation

Global bottlenecks are being absorbed – good news on the energy side

Delivery times and backlog of works now markedly below their longterm average in the US

Indicators of tension in US Mfg -Z-score — Mfg backlog of orders Mfg delivery time 3 2 0 -1 -2 -3 Jan-19 Jan-20 Jan-21 Jan-22 Jan-23 Source: ISM and AXA IM Research, February 2023

Wholesale energy prices markedly off their peak






More signs that US inflation is falling – but the "last mile" may be harder to cover Prudence is of the essence though

Excluding rents, core inflation was negative on a 3month basis

But still a lot of help from used cars





No clear sign the labour market is landing

No wage deceleration to see after the January revisions

Can you really see job creation slowing?

Wages still very strong









US growth prospects: a race between households' excess savings and real wages


The savings' buffers accumulated during the pandemic are being exhausted – but real wages are up again: Fed won't like that!

Not all of the saving overhang will be spent

Household saving rate and model (net worth, inflation, 50+ share of workforce) Saving ratio Forecast 24 Underlying saving estimate 21 18 15 12 9 6 3 Q1 2021 Q1 2023 Q1 2013 Q1 2015 Q1 2017 Q1 2019

Source: BEA, AXA IM Research, Feb 2023

Recent rebound in real wages



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and AXA IM Research, January 2023





Core inflation continues to rise in the Euro area

Headline inflation has started to decline – but message from core is more ambiguous

Headline inflation markedly down

For core it depends on the metric





Source: Eurostat, ECB and AXA IM Research, January 2023



European disinflation ahead – but getting back to 2% will be difficult

Headline down thanks to energy – but "sticky" core inflation

Deceleration of headline inflation should continue


If wholesale energy prices remain low, base effect should grow through 2023, lowering headline inflation by c. 5p between now and the end of 2023

Deceleration of core inflation will take time

- We believe core reached a peak at around 5.2% but our forecasts remain sticky and elevated in Q1 (5.1%) and Q2 (4.5%).
- Resilient demand and generous fiscal support are creating higher risk for endogenous inflation (inflation generated by higher wages/constant level of margins), which could complicate ECB policy

Our 2024 inflation forecast would remain above 2% in 2024 (2.8%)

Our profile for inflation




In annual average

EA	2022	2023	2024
Headline	8.2%	5.9%	2.8%
Core	3.9%	3.7%	2.4%


Source: Eurostat, AXA IM Research, December 2022


Averted catastrophe in Europe...

Decline in consumption helped get through the winter




Source: ENTSO-G, THE, Eurostat, Barclays Research





Source: Bloomberg, Barclays Research



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
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... triggering a relief reaction in confidence, but levels remain mediocre


The "absence of catastrophe" consistent with stagnant economy

Nothing to write home about even if confidence has rebounded somewhat



Source: Refinitiv, AXA IM Research, February 2023

European consumers are less depressed, but still very depressed



Source: European Commission, AXA IM Research, February 2023



An old drama makes a return: the debt-ceiling showdown

Last minute solutions have always been found – but to avoid a default, a fiscal contraction may have to be on the cards

- "Extraordinary measures" now implemented to deal with the USD 31.4 trn debt ceiling (e.g. postponing payments into federal employees pension funds). This buys up to 6 months of wiggle room, but this remains uncertain (spending is predictable, unless unemployment shoots up, income depends on fairly volatile tax receipts).
- The 2011 crisis was ultimately resolved through a spending cut agreement with the Republicans. This is the Republicans' goal this time, but Biden explicitly refuses to negotiate (for now). If no solution is found, the only alternative to a default is to divert tax receipts away from "ordinary spending" to prioritize the debt service, triggering a massive contraction in aggregate demand (as a proxy, the US federal government would be forced into a brutal adjustment towards a primary surplus).
- Some institutional "solutions" are being mooted (e.g. using the 14th amendment of the Constitution) but they are legally controversial.
- It's in both parties' interest to let the drama unfold until "the last minute".



China and inflation (1)


There is a lot of slack in the Chinese economy – should keep manufactured goods prices tame globally

No response of the real estate sector to monetary stimulus so

Credit impulse and house sales 100% -House sales (Lhs) -Credit impulse (Rhs) 25 20 80% 15 60% 10 40% 20% 0% -20% -40% -15 2008 2010 2020 2022 2016 2018

Source: CEIC, AXA IM Research, January 2023

Unemployment is historically high







China and inflation (2)

A race between Chinese demand for gas and US production capacity



US production capacity projected to rise by c. 10 bcm





Jan-22

Jan-23

Jan-24

Source: EIA, AXA IM Research, January 2023

Jan-21

Jan-20




0 Jan-19


China and inflation (3)

China has become the world's "marginal consumer" of oil – this may be the key channel for a rebound of price pressure

China consumes 1/6th of the world's oil production



A catch-up in Chinese oil demand would have a significant impact on the global market





EM outside China: no "systemic risk" territory, but the monetary tightening will bite

Still a lot of reserves in aggregate – but watch Eastern Europe and Latam – but central banks in heavy lifting mode


Only small drawdown in historically huge FX reserves

Source: Refinitiv Datastream and AXA IM Research Q4 22

FX reserves ex gold (trn USD) 10 EM ASIA LATAM 6 **EM EUROPE** 20

Massive monetary tightening in general

Policy rates (change past 18 months, bps)



Source: Refinitiv Datastream and AXA IM Research Dec 22



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



Is a replication of the "1994 miracle" plausible?

There was only one episode of Fed tightening which did not end up in a GDP contraction – and it was only 300 bps

In 1994 the Fed set out to kill imaginary inflation

Debt was lower at the time





The risk of ignoring the lagged effect of monetary tightening

History tells us long delays can appear between CB hikes and a reaction of the real economy


It usually takes more than a year for the effect to show up...



Source: Federal Reserve and AXA IM Research, February 2023

... on the labour market

US payrolls during Fed tightenings



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and AXA IM Research, February 2023




Looking for canaries in the coalmine...

Where variable mortgage rates dominate and housing markets are stretched, pain ahead

UK house prices to fall

House prices and the RICS housing survey **RICS** indices % yoy 75 15 50 10 25 0 -25 -5 -50 -10 RICS - New buyers and sellers (diff,10m lead, LHS) RICS house price balance (6m lead, LHS) -75 -15 Nationwide HPI (RHS) -100 -20 Feb-08 Aug-10 Aug-15 Feb-18 Aug-20 Feb-23 Source: RICS, Nationwide, AXA IM Research, March 2023


It's happening quickly by historical standards





... and looking at dissenters

Canada is pausing => slower core inflation trumps still tight labour market






Japan: time for a policy change ...but beware of the transition risks

Inflation is back – but removing YCC too soon could be painful

Inflation ...waiting for confirmation from wages


Underlying measures of inflation



Source: BOJ, AXA IM Research, March 2023

Backlash from the end of QE would be significant

JGB yields and BoJ Balance Sheet



Source: Refinitiv, AXA IM Research, January 2023







Knock on effect on US yields?

Japanese investors have been reducing their exposure on treasuries - a question mark on the European market

Japan's holding share of US treasurues below that of Europe nowadays

Less reliance of US federal debt funding on non-residents






Focus on equity valuations (1)


Expected earnings have come down – in line with expectations of a near stagnant economy

Earnings expectations are not out of line with a "nearly stagnating" economy in 2023 in the US...



Annual GDP growth (%)
Source: IBES, BEA, Bloomberg and AXA IM Research, February 2023


... and in Europe





Focus on equity valuations (2)

When compared with low-risk yiels in FI, US equity looks very expensive



Less problematic in Europe Europe - Earnings yields gaps vs. bonds Yield gap (%) 5 -5 -10 -15 ----- LT Average 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2022


Source: IBES, ICE BofA and AXA IM Research, February 2023




Medium term challenge #1: narrower fiscal room for manoeuver

Public debt rose over the last 2 decades, but debt service fell. This is over.

Continuous rise in public debt



Continuous drop in debt servicing costs






Medium-term challenge #2: « Greenflation »

The green transition may well trigger structural inflationary pressure

The significant rise in carbon price in the EU

Carbon price 120 EUR/ton 100 80 60 40 20 Jan-17 Jan-18 Jan-19 Jan-20 Jan-21 Jan-22 Source: Eikon Refinitiv and AXA IM Research, November 2022

Cleaner technologies are not ncessarily cheaper





Medium-term challenge #3: « de-globalization »

It has already started in the financial sphere – trade deglobalization would collide with the disinflation objective though



The US/China bilateral relationship



China continues to export disinflation to the rest of the world



US department of commerce, AXA IM Research, November 2022

Source: US Census, Fed, AXA IM Research, November 2022



Medium-term challenge # 4: the US rising competitiveness vs Europe


Lower cost of energy will play in favour of the US in a context of industrial re-localization

Very low electricity prices in the US

2009

Source: UK Dpt for business and energy and AXA IM Research, November 2022

Even in renewables the US have an advantage



Source: IRENA and AXA IM Research, November 2022

2014

2019

2004

1999

Summary of forecasts

D. J. CDB	2022*		2023*		2024*	
Real GDP growth (%)	AXA IM	Consensus	AXA IM	Consensus	AXA IM	Consensus
Vorld	3.4		2.6		2.7	
dvanced economies	2.7		0.9		0.7	
US	2.1	1.9	0.7	0.3	0.3	1.1
Euro area	3.5	3.2	0.8	0.0	0.7	1.2
Germany	1.9	1.7	0.3	-0.5	0.8	1.4
France	2.6	2.5	0.6	0.2	0.8	1.2
Italy	3.9	3.7	0.6	0.0	0.4	1.1
Spain	5.5	4.5	1.1	0.9	0.9	2.0
Japan	1.6	1.5	1.7	1.2	1.3	1.1
UK	4.1	4.4	-0.7	-1.0	0.8	0.6
Switzerland	2.3	2.1	0.6	0.5	1.3	1.7
Canada	3.5	3.4	1.0	0.4	1.0	1.6
merging economies	3.9		3.6		3.8	
Asia	4.2		4.8		4.5	
China	3.0	3.1	5.0	4.6	4.8	5.3
South Korea	2.6	2.6	1.5	1.2	2.0	2.2
Rest of EM Asia	5.7		5.0		4.4	
LatAm	3.7		1.5		2.3	
Brazil	3.0	2.9	1.0	1.0	2.0	1.8
Mexico	2.2	2.9	1.0	1.1	2.0	1.8
EM Europe	1.2		0.0		2.2	
Russia	-3.0		-3.8		2.0	1.2
Poland	4.4	4.9	0.1	0.8	2.4	3.0
Turkey	5.9	5.1	0.5	2.2	1.4	2.4
Other EMs	4.8		3.0		3.4	•

Source: Datastream, IMF and AXA IM Macro Research – As of 21 February 2023 *Forecast

CPI Inflation (%)	2022*		2023*		2024*	
	AXA IM	Consensus	AXA IM	Consensus	AXA IM	Consensus
Advanced economies	7.3		4.7		2.7	
US	8.0	8.1	4.3	3.8	3.0	2.5
Euro area	8.3	8.5	5.7	5.9	2.8	2.4
China	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.3
Japan	2.5	2.4	2.7	1.9	1.5	1.2
UK	9.1	9.0	6.4	7.2	2.3	3.1
Switzerland	2.8	2.9	2.0	2.2	1.3	1.2
Canada	6.8	6.8	4.3	3.7	2.4	2.2

Source: Datastream, IMF and AXA IM Macro Research - As of 21 February 2023

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^{*}Forecast

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